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INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT
LITIGATION: JUDGE JACK B. WEINSTEIN
ON CHOICE OF LAW IN MASS TORT CASES
Scott Fruehwald*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Judge Jack B. Weinstein has declared: "Steps should be taken to
ensure that courts provide individual justice, even in a mass context."'
He has asked: "How can we provide each plaintiff and each defendant
with the benefits of a system in mass torts that treats him or her as an
individual person? How can each person obtain the respect that his or
her individuality and personal needs should command in an egalitarian
democracy such as ours?" 2
This author believes that obtaining individual justice in mass tort
cases requires that aggregation should not change the individual
outcome. The result should be the same in a class action or other
aggregated case as if the same claims had been brought separately in
individual lawsuits. Class actions and other aggregation mechanisms are
procedural devices for combining many claims to obtain efficiency and
allow suits that might not otherwise be heard; they are not otherwise
devices for doing justice on a mass scale.
One area in which justice often differs between class actions and
individual cases is choice of law. Judges adjudicating class actions
usually apply a single jurisdiction's law to all the parties' claims, while,
if the cases had been heard separately, the laws of different jurisdictions

* Instructor, Hofstra University School of Law. University of Louisville (B.M., 1977; J.D.,
1989); University of North Carolina (M.A., 1979); City University of New York (Ph.D., 1984);
University of Virginia (LL.M., 1994; S.J.D. 2001).
1. JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION 2-3 (1995)
[hereinafter WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE].
2. Id.
at 3.
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would probably govern different parties' claims.3 For example, in In re
Bendectin Litigation,4 the court applied Ohio law to all parties on a
proximate cause issue in a drug products liability suit involving injured
parties from throughout the United States against an Ohio manufacturer
that had been consolidated in the Southern District of Ohio. The court
said that it made this choice because "[t]he State of Ohio is responsible
for regulating local aspects of the marketing, manufacture, distribution,
and labeling of the drug, and thus the relationship between the parties is
essentially centered in Ohio, where the tortious conduct and the safety of
the product are regulated." 5 However, if the individual claims had been
heard in the plaintiffs' home states, some (or most) of those states would
have applied forum law because the state where a product is sold and
causes injury has a greater interest in regulating unsafe products than the
state of manufacture does.6 Thus, aggregation changed some of the
individual outcomes.
Most commentators support the use of a single jurisdiction's law
for all parties' claims in class actions involving mass torts.' These
scholars' justifications for the single jurisdiction rule include
(1) unfairness in applying different states' laws to different parties with
injuries arising from the same tort, (2) inconsistent results caused by
adopting different states' laws for the same tort, (3) complexities,
increased costs, and inefficiencies produced by using different states'

3. See

EDWIN

SCOTT

FRUEHWALD,

MULTILATERALIST METHOD 146-48 (2001)

CHOICE OF LAW

[hereinafter

FOR AMERICAN

COURTS:

A

FRUEHWALD, CHOICE OF LAW]; see also,

e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois on May 25, 1979, 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1981);
In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 745 F. Supp. 79 (D.P.R. 1990); In re Disaster at
Detroit Metro. Airport on August 16, 1987, 750 F. Supp. 793 (E.D. Mich. 1989); In re Air Crash
Disaster at Stapelton Int'l Airport, Denver, Colo., on Nov. 15, 1987, 720 F. Supp. 1445 (D. Colo.
1988); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp. 690 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); In re Paris Air
Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732 (C.D. Cal. 1975); Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in
Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 552 (1996). However, there have been a number of
cases in recent years that have refused to certify class actions based on choice of law problems. See
infra Part V.
4. 857 F.2d 290, 302-04 (6th Cir. 1988).
5. Id. at 305.
6. For more on this issue, see infra notes 202-12 and accompanying text.
7. See James A. R. Nafziger, Choice of Law in Air Disaster Cases: Complex Litigation Rules
and the Common Law, 54 LA. L. REV. 1001, 1012-13 (1994); Friedrich K. Juenger, Mass Disasters
and the Conflict of Laws, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 105, 125-27; Paul S. Bird, Note, Mass Tort
Litigation:A Statutory Solution to the Choice of Law Impasse, 96 YALE L.J. 1077, 1078-79 (1987);
Briggs L. Tobin, Comment, The 'Limited Generosity' Class Action and A Uniform Choice of Law
Rule: An Approach to Fair and Effective Mass-Tort Punitive Damage Adjudication in the Federal
Courts. 38 EMORY L.J. 457. 460 (1989).
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laws with the same tort, and (4) forum shopping incentives created when
multiple state laws govern.
A few commentators, however, including the present author, have
criticized the use of a single jurisdiction's law for all parties' claims in a
mass tort case. 9 Reasons for rejecting the single jurisdiction approach
include (1) choice of law used to define substantive rights should be the
same for complex and ordinary cases, (2) adopting a single jurisdiction's
law interferes with state sovereignty and ignores states' interests,
(3) applying a single state's law is not substantive--or forum-neutral,
(4) the single law approach makes choice of law unpredictable, (5) the
single law approach might apply the law of a jurisdiction to a
controversy that the lawmaker did not intend to apply to that
controversy, (6) the single jurisdiction approach is unfair to the
individual, and (7) it is unconstitutional.'
This paper will evaluate individual justice in mass tort cases by
examining Judge Jack B. Weinstein's recent statement concerning his
normative view of choice of law in such cases" and his recent choice of
law decision in Simon v. Philip Morris, Inc.' 2 Judge Weinstein, Senior
District Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York, has been at the forefront of mass tort adjudication, having
been involved in the Agent Orange case, the DES cases, the gun cases,
and the tobacco cases.'3 Judge Weinstein intended that
Simon would
4
resolve most outstanding claims against Big Tobacco.

8. See Juenger, supra note 7, at 109; Tobin, supra note 7, at 480; Bird, supra note 7, at 1077;
Willis L. M. Reese, The Law Governing Airplane Accidents, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1303, 130608 (1982); see also Kramer, supra note 3, at 566-67.
9. See FRUEHWALD, CHOICE OF LAW, supra note 3, at 148-50; Kramer, supra note 3, at 547;
Robert A. Sedler, The Complex Litigation Project's Proposalfor Federally-Mandated Choice of
Law in Mass Torts Cases: Another Assault on State Sovereignty, 54 LA. L. REV. 1085, 1086-87
(1994); Robert A. Sedler, Interest Analysis, State Sovereignty, and Federally-Mandated Choice of
Law in "Mass Tort" Cases, 56 ALB. L. REV. 855, 881 (1993) [hereinafter Sedler, Interest Analysis];
Robert A. Sedler & Aaron D. Twerski, State Choice of Law in Mass Tort Cases: A Response to "A
View from the Legislature," 73 MARQ. L. REV. 625, 627 (1990); Robert A. Sedler & Aaron D.
Twerski, The Case Against All Encompassing Federal Mass Tort Legislation: Sacrifice Without
Gain, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 76, 77 (1989).
10. See FRUEHWALD, CHOICE OF LAW, supra note 3, at 148-50; Kramer, supra note 3, at 549,
569; Sedler, Interest Analysis, supra note 9, at 861-64.
11. See generally Jack B. Weinstein, Mass Tort Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in a
Multinational World Communicating by ExtraterrestrialSatellites, 37 WILLAMEl-rE L. REV. 145
(2001) [hereinafter Weinstein, Mass Tort Jurisdiction].
12. 124 F. Supp. 2d 46 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
13. See, e.g., Simon v. Philip Morris, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 95, 97 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (tobacco
cases); Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 47 F. Supp. 2d 330, 333 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (gun cases); In re DES
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Part II of this paper will present Judge Weinstein's normative view
on choice of law in mass tort cases in the context of his mass tort
philosophy. Part III will examine Judge Weinstein's choice of law
decision in Simon. Part IV will critique Judge Weinstein's normative
view on choice of law and his choice of law decision in Simon. It will
conclude that Judge Weinstein tramples on traditional notions of the
individual in his mass tort cases. It will also argue that the fact that a
case has been aggregated should not change the choice of law criteria.
Finally, Part V will offer a partial solution to the choice of law dilemma
in mass tort cases: subgroups for different substantive laws.

II. JUDGE WEINSTEIN'S NORMATIVE VIEW OF CHOICE OF LAW IN
MASS TORT CASES

Judge Weinstein views mass tort cases as being different from
traditional lawsuits.' 5 In mass tort cases, he often acts like he is dealing
with a political problem that requires a political solution.'6 He has
declared: "Mass tort cases are akin to public litigations involving courtordered restructuring of institutions to protect constitutional rights."' 7 He
has asserted that:
judges, particularly in mass tort cases, cannot and should not remain
neutral and passive in the face of problems implicating the public
interest. In mass tort cases, the judge often cannot rely on the litigants
to frame the issues appropriately. The judge cannot focus narrowly on
the facts before the court, declining to take into account the
relationship of those facts to the social realities beyond the courthouse
Cases, 789 F. Supp. 552, 556 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 580 F. Supp.
690,692 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
14. See Bob Van Voris, Blue Cross Tobacco Case Set for Trial in Brooklyn, NAT'L L.J., Apr.
2, 2001, at A5.
15. In addition to his advocacy of changes in mass tort litigation, Judge Weinstein also argues
for alternatives to mass tort litigation, such as alternate dispute resolution, a national health care
system, a federal legislative scheme, and expansion of social security benefits. See, e.g.,
WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE,

supra note 1,
at 4-5.

16. See Martha Minow, Judge for the Situation: Judge Jack Weinstein, Creator of Temporary
Administrative Agencies, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2010,2018-19 (1997).
17. Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 469,
472 (1994) [hereinafter Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas]. He once stated that "lais one wise scholar
told me, 'Mass torts are public interest cases."' Id. at 476. In criticizing this view, Professor Linda
S.Mullenix has averred: "Judge Weinstein would very much like mass tort litigations to be 'public
law' litigation because, as a 1960s-style activist judge, he could intervene assertively in mass tort
cases to impose court-ordered solutions, just as he did in school desegregation and mental health
cases." Linda S.Mullenix, Mass Tort as Public Law Litigation: Paradigm Misplaced, 88 NW. U. L.
REV. 579, 580 (1994).
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door. The judge cannot depend upon the slow creep of case-by-case
adjudication to yield just results and just rules of law.' 8
Thus, "judges cannot rely upon a narrow application of law to fact
to yield justice,"' 9 and "[c]ompensation to the individual is not the endall of modern mass tort law; remedies' effects on the community cannot
be ignored."2 °
Despite his statements on the importance of the individual in mass
tort cases, a large part of Judge Weinstein's view of justice with mass
torts is that there is a communitarian interest that transcends the
individual parties.2 He has averred: "What renders a mass tort case
different is the degree to which all participants-judges, lawyers, and
litigants-must deal with the case as an institutional problem with
sociopolitical implications extending far beyond the narrow confines of
the courtroom. 22 As Professor Martha Minow has observed, "[i]n this
vision, justice is the touchstone and a concern for everyone, not just the
named parties. Justice requires attention to whole situations, not just to
neatly parsed, pristine legal issues. 23 In fact, for Judge Weinstein, the
judge is the community's guardian: "Because the judge is 'impartial' in
the sense of lacking any personal stake in a particular outcome, the judge
can, through the process of education and evaluation (i.e., judging),
become 'partial' in favor of the communities' best interests. 24
Because of his communitarian view of justice in mass tort cases,
Judge Weinstein's approach to such cases is activist. Judge Weinstein
"believes that an activist government plays a legitimate role in fostering
the trust necessary to break out of collectively self-defeating pursuits of
individual interests. 25 Using this attitude, Judge Weinstein often ignores
the niceties of precedent and the traditional role of the judge, to create
18. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas, supra note 17, at 540.
19. Id. at 484.
20. Id. at 486.
21. Martha Minow has declared that "Weinstein has repeatedly crafted a role as 'judge for the
situation,' defined broadly enough to move beyond private parties to wider communities." Minow,
supra note 16, at 2011.
22. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas, supra note 17, at 483. Elsewhere he has stated: "We can
evaluate class action procedures realistically and usefully only by considering their probable effect
within a social and legal system that includes regulation, health and other forms of insurance,
government benefits and compensation, and legal remedies. We must also consider how the
legislature and public will view the costs and benefits of class action procedures." Jack B.
Weinstein, Some Reflections on United States Group Actions, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 833, 833 (1997).
23. Minow, supra note 16, at 2015.
24. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas, supra note 17, at 542.
25. David Luban, Heroic Judging in an Antiheroic Age, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2064, 2076
(1997).
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new approaches for complex litigation. 26 He has declared, concerning an
innovative decision he made concerning jurisdiction in a mass tort case:
"Was a mere trial judge justified in challenging Supreme Court
jurisprudence? I think so, since I believed some recent Supreme Court
jurisdictional rulings to be misconceived as a matter of constitutional
principle and practical effect; at some point soon they will need
thorough revision. 27 Judge Weinstein believes that judges should step in
when the community does not solve its own problems: "As a general
rule, the need for more intense court intervention is in inverse proportion
to the effectiveness of the community in dealing with disasters."28 In
order to achieve his view of justice, Judge Weinstein strives to keep
everything together in a single lawsuit in his court, believing that mass
disaster claims should be heard in a single forum.29 As Professor Minow
has observed, "[k]eep everyone in one lawsuit, and get the suit goingthese are the watchwords behind Judge Weinstein's magic."3 °
Settlement is a vital part of Judge Weinstein's mass tort philosophy.
He has asserted that "[a] judge's refusal to become involved in details of
settlement or insistence that only considerations of docket management
guide his or her conduct represents, I believe, an abdication of judicial
responsibility." 3' He has stated: "That is where settlement is
important .... It takes it from a state-by-state basis and puts it in the
context of the national and international scientific, medical, and
technological community."32 Elsewhere, he has stated, "[b]y
transcending the narrow interests of the few, the judge can attempt to
ensure that the settlement protects both the immediate and long-term
interests of the many. 33
As stated in the Introduction, Judge Weinstein ostensibly stresses
the importance of "individual" justice in mass tort litigation. His
examples of individual justice include:
26. Joe McLaughlin, former Dean of Fordham Law School, once introduced Judge Weinstein
"as a man who 'never saw an innovation he didn't like."' James L. Oakes, Jack Weinstein and His
Love-Hate Relationship with the Court of Appeals, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1951, 1951 (1997).
27. Jack B. Weinstein, Limits on Judges' Learning, Speaking, and Acting: Part II Speaking
and Part III Acting, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1, 34 (1994).

28. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas, supra note 17, at 488.
29. See Jack B. Weinstein, Preliminary Reflections on the Law's Reaction to Disasters, II
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1,16 (1986) [hereinafter Weinstein, Preliminary Reflections].
30. Minow, supra note 16, at 2017.
31. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas, supra note 17, at 552.
32. Jack B. Weinstein et al., The Future of Class Actions in Mass Tort Cases: A Roundtable
Discussion, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1657, 1675 (1998).
33. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas, supra note 17, at 551.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol31/iss2/2

6

Fruehwald: Individual Justice in Mass Tort Litigation: Judge Jack B. Weinste

20021

JACK B. WEINSTEIN AND CHOICE OF LA W

certification of classes of litigants who could not afford to bring
individual cases; establishment in the Agent Orange case of the
Appeals Office and telephone answering service that enable
complaints to be heard, as well as a judicial policy of answering all
letters sent to the court, and other innovative procedures developed in
the mass tort context; ... use of magistrates and special masters and

other increases in court personnel; and legal representation for the
34
poor.

In addition, in the DES cases, "[a]fter the settlements, one judge
[Weinstein] sat down with many of the DES claimants in chambers and
heard their harrowing stories."35
Judge Weinstein's philosophy on justice in mass tort cases affects
his approach to choice of law in such cases. His view on choice of law in
mass torts is that a judge should be able to adopt the law of a single
jurisdiction in class actions, subject to fair venue controls .36 He has
declared that "[i]n mass torts, reduction of transactional costs, full
protection of the largest number of those injured, the interest of
defendants in stability, and the prompt ending of litigations usually
mandate application of one law in one court."37
The problems he finds in selecting a single state's law in class
actions include
(1) [t]he exaggerated role and importance attached to judicial
jurisdiction relative to that of choice of law ...and (2) [t]he
exaggerated emphasis placed by the law of judicial jurisdiction ... on
defendant's forum contacts as opposed to those of the plaintiff and the
events underlying the controversy-its epitome being the supposed
constitutional requirement of a defendant-forum38 nexus as a sine qua
non for the assertion of in personam jurisdiction.
Judge Weinstein believes that both federal and state limits on personal
jurisdiction go too far, and that there should be no restrictions on
personal jurisdiction except "reasonable forum (venue) and a rational
WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 3.
35. Id. at 13; see also Jack B. Weinstein, Adjudicative Justice in a Diverse Mass Society, 8
J.L. & POL'Y 385, 405 (2000) ("What is particularly important is to try to assuage the fear and
concern of plaintiffs.").
36. See Weinstein, Mass Tort Jurisdiction, supra note 11, at 145; Weinstein, Preliminary
Reflections, supra note 29, at 16 ("It is essential that there be a single, easily determined and
authoritative substantive law applied to the litigation so that the parties know in advance what the
law provides.").
37. Weinstein, Mass Tort Jurisdiction, supra note 11, at 145.
38. Id. at 155.

34.
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state interest in the litigation."3 9 He thinks that the current Supreme
Court rules on personal jurisdiction are outdated, especially when the
Internet or cyberspace is involved.40 He has asserted: "Does it make
sense to prove that the e-mail or Internet satellite was over New York
when plaintiff X in England ordered 'The Product' from Indonesia or
was
that the airplane containing the passenger ordering 'The Product'
4'
made?"
was
order
the
when
Airport
Kennedy
F.
John
circling
In connection with torts involving parties throughout the world,
Judge Weinstein feels that the only relevant question is: "[i]s New York
a convenient forum for all of these plaintiffs, and is it fair to haul
someone like the Indonesian defendant company into court in New York
to resolve the entire controversy between all interested defendants and
all putative plaintiffs?"42 The key point is that the defendant "may be part
of a huge international and national network., 43 If a small organization is
involved, a venue ruling should keep it out.' Judge Weinstein then asks,
with the small organizations eliminated, is it unfair to hear the
controversy in a single forum? 5
Concerning choice of law, Judge Weinstein believes that a judge
should be able to adopt a single state's law for class actions involving
mass torts 6 Otherwise, the problems in adjudicating a class action
become insuperable:
If more than fifty different laws (including those of other nations)
apply, it is almost impossible to divide the plaintiffs into sub-classes or
deal with a single consolidated case in one court for pretrial or trial
purposes, and to give intelligible jury instructions. Given a lack of
familiarity with the laws of distant fora, transfers or forum
47
nonconveniens decisions would scatter the suits all over the map.
Moreover, there is no longer a uniform common law of torts in the

United States.4" Rather, "recent statutory changes resulting from battles
in state legislatures between defense and plaintiff attorney lobbies have

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 146.
See id. at 146-47, 149.
Id. at 149.
Id. at 150.
Id.
See id. at 150-51.
See id. at 151.
See generally id. at 151-54.
Id. at 152.
See id.
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created a substantive law Tower of Babel., 49 In addition, "in many mass
cases, transactional costs become extreme and discrepancies in awards
become impossible to justify on pragmatic or moral terms."5
A problem for Judge Weinstein is that, under Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins5 and Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.,52 a
federal court must apply the tort and conflicts laws of the state in which
it is sitting. 3 For example, in a products liability case in a New York
federal court, New York law would probably apply to those plaintiffs
who bought the product in New York or are domiciled in New York
because New York has an interest in protecting its residents, but in cases
where a person bought the product in another state, New York conflicts
rules would probably require the application of the law of the place
where a person bought a product or where the person became ill from
ingesting it ("the conflict's center of gravity") 4
For Judge Weinstein, the solution to this difficulty is creativity. 5
He has asked:
[w]hy not hold that New York-with a large number of claimantshas an interest in seeing that the whole dispute is settled fairly, quickly,
and cheaply so New York residents and others get the fullest share
possible of any recovery? If this means New York law should apply to
the whole dispute to reduce transactional costs, then why not develop a
new New York choice-of-law rule? New York has been the leader in
shifting from old choice-of-law rules to a center-of-gravity approach,
so why not another shift to a more expansive view of state interest in
mass cases?56
Judge Weinstein concludes that there should be a single test for
choice of law and personal jurisdiction: If it is fair to assert personal
jurisdiction in a forum, then a court could apply forum law to the
controversy. 7 Judge Weinstein does not view Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts," the leading Supreme Court case on constitutional constraints on

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Id. at 153.
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
313 U.S. 487 (1941).
See Weinstein, Mass Tort Jurisdiction, supra note 11, at 151.
See id. at 151-52.
See id. at 153.
Id. at 153-54.
See id. at 154.
472 U.S. 797 (1985); see infra notes 108-17 and accompanying text.
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choice of law in class actions, as a barrier to this change. 9 He has stated:
"The reason for 'significant contacts' limits on such a choice-of-law
concept, or of alternative solutions such as a 'best law' rule, seem less
than compelling." 6 In addition, Judge Weinstein downplays federalism
concerns:
[S]hould Missouri complain that its public policy is being violated by
treating Missouri residents who used "The Product" under New York
substantive law as fairly as possible in one combined litigation? Does
Missouri have an interest in protecting its manufacturers against some
parts of the suit in New York (those involving Missouri plaintiffs
harmed by "The Product" manufactured in Missouri)? Does Missouri
really need more difficult individual cases in its state or federal court?'
One can see Judge Weinstein's creativity in choice of law in In re
Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation62 (a mass tort case involving
injuries to Vietnam veterans allegedly caused by the anti-foliant
chemical Agent Orange), where he faced the obstacle that he could not
use federal common law because the Second Circuit had ruled that
"'there is [no] identifiable federal policy at stake in this litigation that
warrants the creation of federal common law rules.' 63 Instead, he
applied a "national consensus law of manufacturer's liability," on the
ground that national consensus law was consistent with state and federal
decisions. 64 He declared, "[a] state court would therefore have •no,,61rational
choice but to apply federal or national consensus common law. While
it is logical to apply a single law to a situation like Agent Orange, where
a large number of persons were injured by the same product under
similar circumstances, there was no legal basis for Judge Weinstein's
decision. There was no reason to think that any state court would apply
national consensus law; if there had been a national consensus law, there
would have been no conflict in the first place. Despite Judge Weinstein's
statement concerning precedents, there was no real precedent for this
59. See Weinstein, Mass Tort Jurisdiction, supra note 1I,at 154.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. 580 F. Supp. 690 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). 1 will not deal with this case in detail because it has
been discussed extensively elsewhere. See FRUEHWALD, CHOICE OF LAW, supra note 3, at 146-47;
Kramer, supra note 3, at 561-64; PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS Toxic
DISASTERS IN THE COURTS 128-31 (1986); Aaron D. Twerski, With Liberty and Justice for All: An
Essay on Agent Orange and Choice of Law, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 341 (1986).
63. Agent Orange, 580 F. Supp. at 693 (quoting In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 635
F.2d 987, 993 (2d Cir. 1980)).
64. Id. at713.
65. Id. at 712.
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decision.66 The use of national consensus law was one step in forcing a
settlement in this case, which satisfied Judge Weinstein's notion of mass
tort justice. Judge Weinstein's choice of law decision was never
challenged because his choice of law decision was never appealed
because the case was settled.67 As Stephen B. Burbank has noted, "[i]n
Agent Orange Judge Weinstein, pursuing the goal of settlement, applied
what he knew was not generally understood as the law, and did
everything he could to make sure that the train he was conducting was
not derailed by the Court of Appeals. 68
III.

TORT
JUDGE WEINSTEIN'S VIEW ON CHOICE OF LAW IN MASS
69
SEEN INSIMON V. PHILIP MORRIS, INC.

CASES AS

In Simon, Judge Weinstein "creatively" interpreted New York's
choice of law rules to apply New York law (forum law) to all claims. 0
He could not adopt national consensus law because there was not a
national concern such as existed in Agent Orange of compensating
American soldiers who had been exposed to toxic chemicals in a foreign
war. Rather, he had to comply with the Klaxon7' rule that a federal court
sitting in diversity must follow the choice of law rules of the state in
which it sits. However, because the New York Court of Appeals had
never ruled on choice of law in mass tort actions, his role was to predict
how the court would rule under such circumstances 7. He asserted that
"[b]ecause the New York Court of Appeals has never directly spoken to
conflicts decisions in massive class actions, courts are left to assess
66. See id. at 696.
67. See Kramer, supra note 3, at 564.
68. Stephen B. Burbank, The Courtroom as Classroom: Independence, Imagination and
Ideology in the Work of Jack Weinstein, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1971, 1989 (1997). Peter H. Schuck
has similarly stated: "In a sense, he played a massive game of chicken in which he made highly
questionable decisions while working for a settlement that would render them invulnerable to
appeal." SCHUCK, supra note 62, at 259.
69. 124 F. Supp. 2d 46 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
70. See id. at 46.
71. 313 U.S. 487, 487 (1941). A few writers have attacked the validity of this rule. See Scott
Fruehwald, Choice of Law in Federal Courts: A Reevaluation, 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 21, 36-44 (199899); Patrick J. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, the Rise of Legal Positivism, and a
Brave New World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 TEX. L. REV. 79, 118-23 (1993). However, the Court has
vigorously upheld the rule since Klaxon. See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 532 (1990);
Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3, 4 (1975) ("A federal court in a diversity case is
not free to engraft onto those state rules exceptions or modifications which may commend
themselves to the federal court, but which have not commended themselves to the State in which the
federal court sits.").
72. See Simon v. Philip Morris, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 2d 46, 69 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
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trends in New York law, history, and current scholarship to reach a 'just,
fair, and logical result."' 73 In making this determination, he considered
"the unique characteristics of the Tobacco case-the global fraud
concerning the risks of highly mobile products, with huge, long term
consequences for public health."74 He thought that, in such a case, a
court should avoid fixed rules and principles.75
A.

Judge Weinstein on New York Choice of Law Rules and Principles
and Choice of Law History

To justify his single jurisdiction choice of law decision, Judge
Weinstein undertook an extensive examination of New York conflicts
rules, and he traced choice of law history to antiquity. 76 In Babcock v.
Jackson, the most important New York choice of law case, the New
York Court of Appeals had adopted a form of interest analysis for tort
conflicts.77 According to Judge Weinstein:
[t]he foundation of this current approach is that: "[j]ustice, fairness
and, the best practical result, may best be achieved by giving
controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction which, because of its
relationship or contact with the occurrence or the parties has the
greatest concern with the specific issue raised in the litigation. 78
In addition, Babcock stated that there was no reason that all issues in a
case should be decided by the same state's law:
[w]here the issue involves standards of conduct, it is more than likely
that it is the law of the place of the tort which will be controlling, but
the disposition of other issues must turn, as does the issue of the

73. Id.
74. Id,
75. See id.
76. See id. at 62-69.
77. 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963). Babcock involved whether New York or Ontario law would
govern the issue of a car owner's liability for negligence to a passenger in his car concerning a
traffic accident that occurred in Ontario involving New York domicilliaries. See id. at 280-81. New
York law would have allowed full recovery, while Ontario law did not permit a passenger in a
automobile to recover from the car owner. See id. at 280. The court adopted New York law because
New York had the greatest interest in the relationship between the parties. See id. at 284. In
addition, since Ontario's limitation of liability was intended to protect Ontario insurance companies,
Ontario had no interest in applying its law because an Ontario insurance company was not involved.
See id.
78. Simon, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 54 (quoting Babcock, 191 N.E.2d at 279).
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standard of conduct itself, on the law of the jurisdiction which has the
strongest interest in the resolution of the particular issue presented.7 9
Post-Babcock cases created guidelines for particular types of cases,
by giving "the greatest weight to those contacts which are relevant to the
policies animating the particular rules in conflict."80 These cases
distinguished between laws that regulated primary conduct (standards of
care) and laws that allocated losses after the tort occurred (guest statutes
and vicarious liability)." With conduct-regulating rules, the law of the
jurisdiction where the tort occurred will usually govern because a
jurisdiction generally has the greatest interest in regulating conduct
within its borders-conduct-regulating rules are intended to influence
conduct to prevent injuries from occurring.82 On the other hand, when
post-event remedial rules are involved, courts consider other factors.83
Difficulties arise when the tortious conduct takes place in one state,
but the injury occurs in another state (such as when defamatory
statements are uttered in Massachusetts, but the injury occurs in
Illinois).M According to Judge Weinstein, Schultz v. Boy Scouts of
America, Inc. 5 has been misquoted for the "proposition that the 'place of
the wrong' is always where the 'last event necessary to make the actor
liable occurred.' 8 6 In this case, a scoutmaster allegedly molested two
New Jersey boys at a New York summer retreat, and he threatened them
at their home in New Jersey.87 When one of the boys committed suicide
in New Jersey, the boy's parents brought a wrongful death action in New
York. 8 The issue was whether New Jersey's charitable immunity statute
barred the action.89 Judge Weinstein noted: "Without applying this rule
directly to the facts, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that in cases
where the alleged conduct and injury occur in different states 'under
traditional rules, the place of the wrong is considered to be the place
where the last event necessary to make the actor liable occurred." 90
79. Simon, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 55 (quoting Babcock, 191 N.E.2d at 285).
80. Simon, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 55 (quoting Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 47 F. Supp. 2d 330, 336-38
(E.D.N.Y. 1999)).
81. See Simon, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 57.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. 480 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y. 1985).
86. Simon, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 57.
87. See Schultz, 480 N.E.2d at 681.
88. See id. at 681-82.
89. See id. at 682.
90. Simon, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 58.
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Judge Weinstein argued that those who interpret Schultz as standing
for the proposition that the last event rule always applied with conduct
regulation were wrong. 9' He declared: "This simple 'last place' criterion
is not chiseled in stone, but rather gives way when it is at war with state
interests so that the more general Babcock principle applies." 92 First,
because the court still looked at contacts relevant to the policies behind
the conflicting rules, the last events test did not replace interest
analysis. 93 Judge Weinstein asserted: "The Schultz court could simply
have relied on the 'last event necessary to make the actor liable' to pinpoint the locus of the tort. Instead, the court moved directly into interest
analysis-isolating the kinds of contacts alleged in the complaint and
their bearing on each respective state." 94 Second, the refinements of
Babcock in later cases were not designed for complex cases.95 Finally,
even though some cases nominally apply the last events test, in products
liability and airplane crash cases, New York federal courts use some
type of interest analysis.96 Judge Weinstein stated that "[iln airplane
crashes and products liability cases, even courts claiming to apply rigid
rules do not strictly abide by them, but ultimately turn their decisions on
some evaluation of the theoretical and practical aspects of the
jurisdictions' interests in the action. 97
Judge Weinstein argued that conflicts history supported applying
New York substantive law to all parties in this case. 9s He saw two
concerns undergirding choice of law analysis: (1) concepts of
sovereignty and (2) fairness. 99 He thought that modern conflicts law

91. See id. at 57-59.
92. Id. at 58.
93. See id.
94. Id. at 59.
95. See id. at 58.
96. See id. For example, in Pescatorev. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 97 F.3d I, 13 (2d
Cir. 1996), the court displaced the traditional rule when an explosion occurred over Scotland, but
the causative misconduct occurred in either Frankfurt or London. Similarly, in Campbell v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., No. 83 Civ. 6282-CSH, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19271, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. June 3, 1985), the court stated that multi-state product liability cases presented
extraordinary circumstances that precluded application of the traditional rule. See also Hadar v.
Concordia Yacht Builders, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 1082, 1093 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Carlenstolpe v. Merck &
Co., 638 F. Supp. 901, 908 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). But see Batruk v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., Nos. 94
Civ. 7593 (KMW), 94 Civ. 8677 (KMW), 1998 WL 307383 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 1998);
Kramer v. Showa Denko K.K., 929 F. Supp. 733, 740 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). Note that all these cases are
federal, not state, cases.
97. Simon, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 60.
98. See id. at 62-65.
99. See id. at 63. Similarly, Professor Harold P. Southerland has recently stated:
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marked "a return to principles of flexibility and policy evaluations that
date back to antiquity."'' ° He felt that three historical trends were
relevant to the present case:
1) notions of individual justice have trumped sovereign interests in
affairs that by their nature have a supranational scope; 2) the unique
nature of some cases demand flexibility and comparison of alternative
results achieved by applying different laws; and 3) the changing forms
of personal injury in the twentieth century, due to increased mobility of
goods, people, and information, may impose strong pressures on
conflicts norms, and demand a return to interest based solutions in
101
some cases.
Judge Weinstein also thought that recent scholarship and precedent
in complex litigation suggested that the wheel had "turned to a 'period
of equity and natural law' with regard to modern, complex tort
problems.' ' 2 He stated that "[m]ost modern scholarship concludes that
choice of law rules can, and should, lead to the application of either a
few state laws, a single state law, federal common law, national
consensus law, or abandoning Klaxon analysis altogether in complex
litigation."'0'3 In addition, according to Judge Weinstein, judges have
preferred material justice in conflicts cases, and courts have been
influenced by the new scholarship in many single-accident mass-disaster
cases." For example, in In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, Illinois
on May 25, 1979,1'5 the court used the "'most significant relationship'
test to justify application of Illinois law on punitive damages
[to smooth]
6
over minor differences in various relevant state laws."3
Judge Weinstein concluded his long analysis of New York choice
of law rules and conflicts history by stating:
There are fewer such values [in choice of law] than one might think. In fact, there are
only two that are really important, and they have taken clear shape in the decision
making of the Twentieth Century. The first is rooted in sovereignty and the need for the
accommodation of differences, the second in the judicial impulse to decide conflicts
cases in ways that make good sense. In all the difficult cases it is these values that are
invariably in conflict. Resolving the tension between them is what is hard-and
controversial-in choice of law.
Harold P. Southerland, Sovereignty, Value Judgments, and Choice of Law, 38 BRANDEIS L.J. 451,
456-57 (2000).
100. Simon, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 66.
101. Id. at 67.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 68-69.
105. 644 F.2d 594, 616 (7th Cir. 1981).
106. Simon, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 69 (emphasis added).
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[w]hile New York has fashioned some rules to lend uniformity to
conflicts analysis in general, these rules do not contemplate a complex
fact pattern such as this one. This area of the law in New York is still
cooking. Under these circumstances, courts are required to return to
the fundamental rule of New York, the Babcock interest analysis.' °7
Judge Weinstein also had to deal with constitutional limitations.
The defendants had argued that, even if they had done substantial
business in New York and even if they had operated a national fraud
from New York, New York courts could not apply its law to individual
transactions that were not clearly connected to the state.' °s They declared
that under Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,0 9 a state "must have a
significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts to the claims
asserted by 'each member of the plaintiff class' to ensure that the choice
of that state's law is not arbitrary or unfair."" 0 Judge Weinstein believed
that there were significant contacts to satisfy this due process and full
faith and credit standard.'' First, two of the defendants had their
principle places of business in New York, and they had been
headquartered there for many years."2 Second, much of the tobacco
industry's conduct occurred in New York, especially the alleged
conspiracy that lead to the plaintiffs' damages." 3 Third, the firm the
tobacco companies' retained to create their public relations program was
a New York corporation with its principal place of business in New
York, and this firm recommended that the industry establish a
subcommittee of chief executives resident in New York.' 14 Fourth, the
major tobacco companies also created entities in New York that
produced important data that the tobacco companies used to argue
against the link between smoking and lung cancer, heart disease, and
other illnesses."' Fifth, the tobacco industry had numerous business and
legal connections to New York. ' 16 Finally, the tobacco industry sells a
substantial quantity of cigarettes in New York.' 17

107.
108.
109.
110.
Ill.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
See id.
472 U.S. 797, 821 (1985); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981).
Simon, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 69.
See id. at 70-71.
See id. at 70.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 70-71.
See id. at 71.
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B.

Judge Weinstein'sApplication of New York Choice of Law
Principlesand Rules to the Tobacco Litigation

After establishing the choice of law principles to be applied in
meticulous detail, Judge Weinstein had to ascertain whether there was a
material conflict of laws. He thought that the main elements of
fraudulent concealment, the plaintiffs' core theory, although not uniform
in every state, shared many characteristics." 8 A plaintiff must generally
establish that "(1) the defendant had a duty to disclose; (2) the defendant
suppressed material facts; (3) the suppression induced the plaintiff to act
or to refrain from acting; and (4) the plaintiff suffered damages as a
proximate result of the defendant[']s conduct."" 9 He noted, however,
that there are some significant differences in the elements of fraudulent
concealment among the states.' 20 First, at least three alternativessuperior knowledge, partial disclosure, and fraudulent concealmentinclude a duty to disclose.' 21 Second, the relevant jurisdictions disagree22
whether reliance is determined objectively or subjectively.'
Consequently, since there are conflicts between New York law and the
other relevant states' laws, 23Judge Weinstein needed to undertake a
choice of law determination.'
Judge Weinstein decided that New York's interest was stronger
than any other state's interest.1 24 Under New York law, the most
important contacts for determining state interests in tort cases are the
parties' domiciles and the locus of the tort.' 25 The plaintiffs were
domiciled and harmed throughout the country, while the defendants
were domiciled in New York, North Carolina, and Kentucky.' 26 Judge
Weinstein, however, felt27that "the gravamen of defendants' misconduct
occurred in New York."'
Judge Weinstein then compared the relevant states' interests. He
stated that the main reasons for applying forum-locus law (New York
law) in this type of case are: "(1) to protect medical creditors who
provided services to injured parties; (2) to prevent injured tort victims
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

See id.
Id.
See id. at 72.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 73.
See id. at 72.
See id.
Id.
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from becoming wards in the locus state; and (3) to deter future
tortfeasors in the locus state."'' 28 He felt that New York and the other
states had an interest in the first two factors because smoking had
created a medical crisis that had substantially burdened all fifty states.'2 9
Concerning the third factor, deterrence, he stated that "New York has an
obvious and substantial interest in ensuring that it does not become
either a base or a haven for law breakers to wreak injury nationwide."'30
According to the complaints,
a substantial part of the alleged conspiracy
3
occurred in New York.1 1
Judge Weinstein admitted that the plaintiffs' domicile states might
have a regulatory interest in compensatory damages. 32 However, he
asserted that "[s]tates that disallow or limit compensatory damages, just
as those that disallow punitive damages, are more interested in
controlling excessive liability (or loss allocation) than in punishing and
deterring conduct.' ' 33 Judge Weinstein argued that "[i]n complex tort
litigation, jurisdictions with the strongest nexus to the offending conduct
have the greatest interests in punishment and deterrence."' 3 4 Judge
Weinstein concluded that New York had a greater interest than the other
states in establishing compensatory damages because issues of general
compensatory liability affect the regulation of dangerous conduct within
New York.'35 He declared:
Determining general questions of liability under New York law
dovetails well with a policy ensuring that New York can enforce its
own set of civil obligations amongst its own domiciliaries and serve as
an effective forum for determining injuries for its own (and others')
citizens, who, without
a centralized trial, may be left without an
16
remedy.
effective
Judge Weinstein thought that the interests of the other states were
less important because he envisioned transferring individual
128. Id. (citing Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y. 1985)).
129. See Simon, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 72.
130. Id.
131. See id. ("CTR, which was a major vehicle'for perpetuating the conspiracy, operated in
New York. A number of critical meetings of Tobacco representatives necessary to orchestrate the
scheme allegedly occurred in New York, and at least two of the companies, Lorillard and Philip
Morris, Inc., have their principle places of business in New York.").
132. See id.
133. Id. at 72-73.
134. Id. at73.
135. See id.
136. Id.at 74.
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compensatory damages questions to the individuals' home states.'37 He
asserted: "Through the use of depecage ... each claimant will rely upon
his or her own state law with regard to critical individual recovery
issues."'38 In addition, Judge Weinstein argued that "[s]tates can have a
broader concern with the protection of the welfare of their own citizens
than in the strict application of their own law."'3 9 Similarly, he stated, "a
state's policy interest in allowing application of similar rules of law and
redress for its citizens in another forum may outweigh an interest in
strict application of its own law-particularly if the result is a lack of an
effective remedy for its residents. 1 40 He also believed that states have an
interest in the welfare of all Americans, regardless of where they might
live. 4 ' He maintained: "It is understandable that each state will be
sympathetic to the needs of out-of-state residents, particularly when
those needs are intertwined with those of its own citizens. ,,142
IV. CRITIQUE OF JUDGE WEINSTEIN'S NORMATIVE VIEWS ON CHOICE
OF LAW IN MASS TORT CASES AND HIS CHOICE OF LAW DECISION
IN SIMON

This author disagrees with Judge Weinstein's general views on
justice in mass tort cases, his normative views on choice of law, and his
choice of law decision in Simon.
A.

Critiqueof Judge Weinstein's View of Justice in Mass Tort Cases
and His Normative Approach to Choice of Law in Such Cases

This author disagrees with Judge Weinstein's view of justice in
mass tort actions. 143 While a judge's decision does affect the community,
137. See id.
138. Id. at 74. Depecage involves applying different states' laws to different issues in the same
case. According to Judge Weinstein, "[d]epecage doctrine recognizes that in a single action different
states may have different degrees of interests with respect to different operative facts and elements
of a claim or defense." Id. at 75. For example, one state's law might control for liability issues,
while another state's law governs vicarious liability. Judge Weinstein believes that depecage is
appropriate in the tobacco cases: "While New York has a paramount interest in punishing and
deterring misconduct in New York, other states have a concurrent interest in ensuring that their own
citizens receive individual relief in line with their own compensatory schemes." Id. at 76.
139. Id. at 75.

140. Id.
141. See id.
142. Id.
143. Scholars have criticized the use of class actions and other aggregation devices for mass
torts for reasons other than those discussed here in detail. For example, Genine C. Swanzey has
identified the following additional problems: (1) conflicts between present and future claimants due
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the judge should focus on the individual claims. In a mass tort case, each
plaintiff by definition has a significant injury. For example, in
connection with the Bendectin litigation, Professor Roger H. Trangsrud
has observed, "[i]n my view the use of a mass trial to resolve the great
bulk of the Bendectin claims was a mistake because the claims in that
case were substantial, merited individualized trials, and were afforded
only a compromised due process when tried as a group." ' 4 4 A mass tort
case is not like aggregation of many small claims, none of which would
be worthwhile pursuing on an individual basis. 4 5 Nor, is a mass tort case
like a class action in which there has been an injury to a group, as in a
discrimination case. In the case of mass torts, class action rules or other
procedural joinder or consolidation rules should be used only to bring a
number of similar cases together for judicial efficiency; such rules
should not change the case's outcome. 46 In addition, as some scholars
have pointed out, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 was never intended
to dramatically change how mass tort cases are handled, but, rather, was
to the latency of many diseases, (2) conflicts among current clients because of varying objectives,
(3) conflicts between class members and class counsel when settlements may not be in the best
interests of clients, and (4) problems of communication between attorneys and class members. See
Genine C. Swanzey, Note, Using Class Actions to Litigate Mass Torts: Is There Justice for the
Individual? II GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 421, 434 (1998); see also Roger C. Cramton, Individualized
Justice, Mass Torts, and "Settlement Class Actions": An Introduction, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 811,
823-36 (1995). Concerning the problem of the conflict between present and future claimants,
Professor Coffee has stated:
[d]efendants can offer plaintiffs' attorneys a global settlement by which they agree to
settle the plaintiffs' attorneys' entire inventory of existing cases at the prevailing market
rate for such claims ifthe same attorneys will agree to bring and settle a class action on
behalf of other (largely future) claimants on a less favorable basis.
John C. Coffee, Jr., The Corruption of the Class Action: The New Technology of Collusion, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 851, 852 (1995).
144. Roger H. Trangsrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 69,
73-74 [hereinafter Trangsrud, Mass Trials].
145. Concerning the aggregation of many small claims in one suit, Judge Weinstein has stated:
"The main advantage of such mass actions is that one litigation protects the rights of many. Persons
who would otherwise have claims that are too small to warrant the attention of entrepreneurial
lawyers or who simply do not know that their rights have been violated can be protected." Jack B.
Weinstein, Adjudicative Justice in a Diverse Mass Society, 55 REC. 193, 200 (2000). This author
agrees, as long as the purpose of the lawsuit is to protect the public, not to obtain a large attorney's
fee.
146. As Professor Mullenix has noted: "We should not lose sight of the fact that mass tort
litigation is, after all, merely a collection of individual tort cases brought together by time and
circumstance." Mullenix, supra note 17, at 581. Similarly, Judge Posner has declared in a class
action case, "[t]he diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts is, after Erie, designed merely to
provide an alternative forum for the litigation of state-law claims, not an alternative system of
substantive law for diversity cases." In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1302 (7th Cir.
1995).
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meant to facilitate federal antidiscrimination statutes and federal
regulatory schemes, like antitrust and securities regulation.' 4'
Judge Weinstein's notion of justice in mass tort cases departs from
the basis of our legal system, which is intended to allow individuals to
assert their claims and receive compensation for the wrongdoing of
others. As Professor Trangsrud has stated, "[t]he first purpose of our
civil justice system is and should be to offer corrective justice in
disputes arising between private parties."" 8 He has further observed,
"[f]or centuries, in England and in America, tort claimants with
substantial injuries could expect to control how, when, and where their
cases would be tried.' ' 49 As Professor Stephen C. Yeazell has noted,
"[c]ollective litigation sacrifices individual to group welfare. Forced to
bring or defend claims as groups, individuals lose the control they might
otherwise exert over their lawsuits; sometimes they also lose substantive
rights they would be able to exercise were the suit brought against them
individually."'' 50
When a person is injured in a mass disaster, that person needs full
compensation. It is not enough just to punish the wrongdoer. In many
mass tort cases, plaintiffs do not get a fair share of the settlement.' 5 ' For
example, as Judge Weinstein has observed, in the asbestos cases, less
than forty percent of the total amount expended by defendants will go to
the injured. 2 Similarly, in the Bank of Boston litigation, plaintiffs'
attorneys received eight million dollars in fees despite the fact that the
bank deposited less than nine dollars in each class member's
account,
53
and it withdrew up to ninety dollars from some accounts.'
Similarly, a defendant's liability should not increase because claims
have been combined rather than heard individually. If additional
punishment is merited, that additional punishment should come from
criminal law or administrative action, not from a judge making new
147. See, e.g., Roger Trangsrud, Federalism and Mass Tort Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
2263, 2269 (2000) (citing the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 23) [hereinafter Trangsrud,
Federalism]. The same is true for the Multidistrict Litigation Act. Congress did not pass itin
response to a crisis in the tort system or a multitude of state claims in federal court, but as a reaction
to the electrical equipment price-fixing cases and problems of managing complex antitrust cases.
See id. at 2269-70.
148. Trangsrud, Mass Trials, supra note 144, at 74.
149. Id. at70.
150. Stephen C. Yeazell, Collective Litigation as Collective Action, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV.
43, 68.
151. See infra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
152. See Weinstein, Preliminary Reflections, supra note 29, at 22.
153. See Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 100 F.3d 1348, 1349 (7th Cir. 1996).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2002

21

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 2

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 31:323

rules. In addition, class certification often forces unfair settlements.
Judge Jerry E. Smith has written:
In the context of mass tort class actions, certification dramatically
affects the stakes for defendants. Class certification magnifies and
strengthens the number of unmeritorious claims .... In addition to
skewing trial outcomes, class certification creates insurmountable
pressure on defendants to settle, whereas individual trials would not.
The risk of facing an all-or-nothing verdict presents too high a risk,
even when the probability of an adverse judgment5 4is low. These
settlements have been referred to as judicial blackmail.
Finally, there are also social costs to class actions. Settlement of
class actions may make products more expensive or cause the
unavailability of some products. 55' It may also cause manufacturers to be
wary of innovation.
It is true that without Judge Weinstein's approach, "justice" might
not have been done in certain cases. For example, in Agent Orange,
causation problems and governmental immunity would probably have
prevented the plaintiffs from being compensated in a court of law.'
However, that was a problem with substantive law, and that problem
should have been solved through legislation or by the Supreme Court
overruling its precedents, not by a judge who does not like binding
authority.
A major problem with Judge Weinstein's approach to mass tort
cases is that his decisions do not have to be accounted for because most
mass tort cases are settled.'57 He makes a preliminary decision on
jurisdiction or choice of law, and that decision is not subject to judicial
review because the case is settled. 5' 8

154. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted); see
also In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1297-1300 (7th Cir. 1995).
155. See Sheila Bimbaum, Class Certification-The Exception, Not the Rule, 41 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 347, 351 (1997); see also Phaedon John Kozyris, Conflicts Theory for Dummies: Apr~s le
Deluge, Where Are We on Producers Liability?60 LA. L. REV. 1161, 1173 (2000).
156. See WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE, supra note 1, at xii.
157. See Swanzey, supra note 143, at 427-28.
158. Professor Kramer has observed:
The stated premise of provisional certification is that the court can always decertify later
if the choice-of-law issues complicate matters too much. But later never comes, and
never will, because the cases always settle first-as judges know better than anyone. The
provisional certification ploy thus enables the court to create a class without letting any
pesky choice-of-law problems get in the way.
Kramer, supra note 3, at 565.
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Forced settlements do not always result in justice-for plaintiffs or
defendants. Sheila Birnbaum has declared that "the class action-a
'procedural' device intended to achieve certain efficiencies of scale
through aggregation-is a mighty sword that can affect the substantive
'
outcome of the litigation without regard to the 'merits' of the claims." 59
For example, as Judge Weinstein has pointed out, judges in Mississippi
in complex cases often force large settlements on defendants with the
threat of even larger jury verdicts with punitive damages.1 60 For instance,
in one mass asbestos suit in Mississippi, Mississippi plaintiffs were
awarded over eighteen times the damages that similarly situated
plaintiffs from other states received.161 Judge Weinstein has quoted one
defense attorney involved in such cases: "It's no secret that there are
state courtrooms in Mississippi which have become notorious for
awarding outlandish verdicts to asbestos claimants who are not sick and
as a result, asbestos cases from all over the country tend to migrate
there.' 62 The unfairness is not limited to defendants. For example, courts
have used the single law approach to choice of law to deny punitive
their home states would probably have
damages to some plaintiffs when
63
damages.
such
them
awarded
Judge Weinstein's "emphasis" on his notion of individual justice
does not compensate for what the individual loses in his mass tort
jurisprudence. Listening to the plaintiffs' "harrowing stories" does not
make up for the loss of substantive rights. There is more to respecting
the individual than communication.
This author also disagrees with Judge Weinstein's normative views
on choice-of-law in mass tort cases.' 64 First, reduction of transaction
costs165 is not a reason to change the applicable law and apply a single
jurisdiction's laws to all claims. 66 Parties' claims and defenses should be
159. Birnbaum, supra note 155, at 351.
160. See Weinstein, Mass Tort Jurisdiction, supra note 11, at 147 n.7.
161. Seeid. at 147.
162. Id. at 147 n.7 (quoting Stephen Labaton, Top Asbestos Makers Agree to Settle 2 Large
Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2000, at A22 (quoting Richard A. Weinberg, counsel of the GAF
Corporation)).
163. See FRUEHWALD, CHOICE OF LAW, supra note 3, at 147.
164. For other criticisms of Judge Weinstein's normative view of choice of law in mass tort
cases, see Herma Hill Kay, Currie's Interest Analysis in the 21st Century: Losing the Battle, but
Winning the War, 37 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 123, 130-32 (2001); Arthur T. von Mebren, American
Conflicts Law at the Dawn of the 21st Century, 37 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 133, 139-43 (2001).
165. See Weinstein, Mass Tort Jurisdiction, supra note 11, at 145.
166. Some scholars have argued that the efficiency gains from mass tort cases are speculative.
See, e.g., Trangsrud, Mass Trials, supra note 144, at 78-79.
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governed by the same law that would have controlled absent
aggregation. 67 Individuals have the right to have the proper law control
their conduct, not the law of a state with which they have a weak
connection or no connection at all. 6s The fact that several states' laws
might apply, making maintenance of a class action difficult, is irrelevant.
Efficiency is not more important than applying the proper law.
Second, full protection of the largest number injured 69 does not
support use of the single jurisdiction rule. Substantive law protects
injured persons. Some states' substantive laws provide more protection
than other states' substantive laws.'7 ° As Judge Weinstein has pointed
out, there is no longer a uniform tort law in this country.' Living with
your state's governing law is part of being a community.' This fact
does not change solely because cases have been aggregated. In fact, that
states have different laws on a particular issue might be a reason to not
aggregate cases in the first place.'
The related problem of different recoveries by different parties in
the same lawsuit also does not warrant the single jurisdiction rule. While
74
there may be a "substantive law Tower of Babel" in American tort law,
this disagreement among the states is caused by legitimate disagreement
on the goals of tort law. The states have the sovereignty to enact their
own tort law, and a federal judge has no authority to override those
decisions; as Judge Weinstein himself has noted, Erie and Klaxon still
govern federal judges.' As Professor Trangsrud has observed, the
different recovery argument:
167. Professor Kramer has asserted: "Because choice of law is part of the process of defining
the parties' fights, it should not change simply because, as a matter of administrative convenience
and efficiency, we have combined many claims in one proceeding; whatever choice-of-law rules we
use to define substantive rights should be the same for ordinary and complex cases." Kramer, supra
note 3, at 549.
168. See In re Ford Motor Co. Ignition Switch Prods. Liab. Litig., 174 F.R.D. 332, 347-48
(D.N.J. 1997).
169. See Weinstein, Mass Tort Jurisdiction, supra note 11, at 155.
170. See id. at 152.
171. See id. Professor Kramer has observed that "[n]o one seems to notice the irony of
advocating a choice-of-law rule that selects the law of a single state on the ground that complex
litigation is national in character." Kramer, supra note 3, at 578.
172. Professor Kramer has stated, "[s]uch differences in outcome reflect the fact that different
states with legitimate interests have made different judgments about how to handle tort problems."
Kramer, supra note 3, at 579. Similarly, Professor Southerland has declared, "[elach state in the
United States is sovereign. Each has power within broad limits set by the Constitution to make law
for its own territory." Southerland, supra note 99, at 452.
173. See infra Part V.
174. Weinstein, Mass Tort Jurisdiction, supra note 11, at 152.
175. See Southerland, supra note 99, at 485.
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should have been addressed to James Madison or to
Congress ....
When we have fifty states and defer to state tort law,
there will be ...differences. These differences belong in our federal

system, and there is nothing wrong with such disparate rules or
outcomes. Our government is organized [this] way ...to allow for

precisely these differences.'76
Judge Weinstein's downplaying of federalism concerns is
troubling.' 77 States have the power to make their own decisions
concerning what is fair in a torts case-mwhat torts are compensated, any
limitations on that compensation, and the amount of damages.' 78 As
Professor Southerland has declared, "[w]e have conflicts cases because,
in a surprising number of ways, the law-making bodies of the various
states see the world quite differently."'' 79 A federal judge should not
usurp a state's authority to make its own laws. Does a federal judge
automatically have a better notion of justice than a state legislature? In
any case, a federal judge lacks the power to make such a decision under
Erie and Klaxon.80
Third, the defendant's interest in stability also fails to justify the
single jurisdiction rule.' 8 ' If defendants have such an interest, they would
stipulate to a single jurisdiction's law! Defendants do not lose the right
to have the proper law applied to their cases solely because claims and
parties have been aggregated.
Finally, the prompt ending of the litigation' s2 does not call for the
single jurisdiction rule. As with transaction costs, judicial efficiency
should not affect the applicable law. The applicable law is the most
important aspect of a case. The point of aggregation is to be more
efficient. If choice of law problems destroy that efficiency, the case
should not be a class action.

176. Trangsrud, Federalism, supra note 147, at 2271.
177. See Weinstein, Mass Tort Jurisdiction, supra note 11, 154.
178. As Judge Patrick Higginbotham has noted, "[i]t is easy to say that we will dispense with
the nuanced differences among the state laws, but, remember, those nuanced differences are
reflections of state policies." The Federalist Society: Conference: Civil Justice and the Litigation
Process: Do the Merits and the Search for Truth Matter Anymore? Day One: Panel One: Class
Action Litigation: Introduction, 41 N.Y.L.SCH. L. REV. 337, 377 (1997).
179. Southerland, supra note 99, at 455.
180. Professor Kozyris has declared: "I question whether the national judge has the authority,
the knowledge and the capability to develop such an ad hoc common-law type 'Jus gentium."'
Kozyris, supra note 155, at 1166.
181. See Weinstein, Mass Tort Jurisdiction, supra note 11, at 145.
182. See id.
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In sum, Judge Weinstein's creativity is not a solution to choice of
law problems in mass tort cases. A judge should follow the proper
choice of law rules, not try to find a "creative" justification to
circumvent those rules. As Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, has declared:
There is a price to be paid for confusing legal roles. Think for a
moment of how it feels to be bested by someone who does not follow
the rules. Then multiply your sense of personal disillusionment by the
millions. There is nothing so corrosive to public confidence in public
institutions as the idea that a decision, whether right or wrong,
represented at heart an arrogation of authority. Such usurpation is
unbecoming in constitutional democracies that should rest on the idea
that the crude displacement of proper decisionmaking channels is little
better than a putsch.'83
B.

Critique of Judge Weinstein's Choice of Law Ruling in Simon

In Simon, Judge Weinstein manipulated New York's choice of law
rules to conclude that New York law should control all claims. 1 4 In
doing so, he trampled on individual rights, ignored the sovereignty of
other interested states, and violated the U.S. Constitution.
Judge Weinstein's analysis of New York choice of law rules is
basically correct. Under Babcock and its progeny, a New York court
would have adopted the law of the state with the greatest interest in
having its law applied.'85 Despite its statement that in split conduct/injury
cases the place of the wrong is where the last event to make the actor
liable occurred, Schultz is not an impediment to adopting the law of the
state where the conduct took place if that state is the most interested
state. 86 First, this statement in Schultz is dicta. The issue was loss
distribution-whether charitable tort immunity applied-not conduct
regulation.'87 More importantly, as Judge Weinstein noted, Babcock and
its progeny (including Schultz) indicate that New York would not adopt
the simplistic analysis of the last event rule.'88
In his historical analysis, Judge Weinstein overstated the trend
toward substantive fairness in choice of law. In modern conflicts law and
183.
1390-91
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, Foreword: The Question of Process, 98 MICH. L. REV 1387,
(2000).
See Simon v. Philip Morris, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 2d 46, 78 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
See id. at 54.
See id. at 58-59.
See Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679, 681-82 (N.Y. 1985).
See Simon, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 54-59.
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scholarship, there are several conflicting trends, including the need for
uniformity and predictability, recognition of sovereign interests, and
fairness in several contexts.1 9 Choice of law history does not support any
single approach to resolving conflicts.'" Judge Weinstein also overstated
the role of flexibility in modern conflicts. Again, there is no clear trend.
Judge Weinstein is correct that many federal judges are using the single
jurisdiction rule in class actions and mass tort cases; however, as this
author has observed elsewhere, in doing so, these judges are ignoring
state choice of law rules that under Erie and Klaxon they are required to
follow."9

Judge Weinstein's discussion of New York conflicts rules, choice
of law history, modern conflicts law, and modern scholarship is an
attempt to convince the reader that he does not have to follow the
existing rules. Since substantive fairness is his main inquiry, and since
the New York Court of Appeals has not considered choice of law in a
similar mass tort action, Judge Weinstein does not have to follow the
niceties of New York conflicts rules. He is able to create his own rules
that will obtain the result he wants in harmony with his mass tort
philosophy. However, substantive justice is not the only value in
litigation. Consistency, predictability, and respect for reasonable
expectations are also important values. 9' As Judge Wilkinson has
recently stated, "[a] vision of society where substantive outcomes alone
are paramount thus threatens to engulf us."' 93
The major problem in Judge Weinstein's analysis arises when he
applies interest analysis to the facts of Simon. This case is a split
conduct/injury case. Some of the conduct-involving a significant part
of the conspiracy-took place in New York. 94 However, the companies
sold cigarettes in all fifty states, they advertised in all fifty states, the

189. For a history of choice of law in the twentieth century, including recent developments, see
FRUEHWALD, CHOICE OF LAW, supra note 3, at 9-46. See also Symeon C. Symeonides, American

Choice of Law at the Dawn of the 21st Century, 37 WILLAMEf-IE L. REV. 1 (2001).
190. See FRUEHWALD, CHOICE OF LAW, supra note 3, at 9-46.

191. See id. at 146-47.
192. See id. at 53-54. As Ronald Dworkin has written:
Hercules [the ideal judge] is prevented from achieving integrity viewed from the
standpoint of justice alone-coherence in the substantive principles of justice that flow
throughout his account of what the law now is-because he has been seeking a wider
integrity that gives effect to principles of fairness and procedural due process as well.
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 404 (1986).
193. Wilkinson, supra note 183, at 1387.
194. See Simon v. Philip Morris, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 2d 46, 70-71 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2002

27

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 2

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:323

injured parties were citizens of all fifty states, and the injuries occurred
in all fifty states.'95
As Judge Weinstein stated, under New York conflicts rules, there
are three main reasons for adopting forum/locus law in a case: "(1) to
protect medical creditors who provided services to injured parties; (2) to
prevent injured tort victims from becoming wards in the locus state; and
(3) to deter future tortfeasors in the locus state.' 96 Judge Weinstein's
conclusion that all fifty states, including New York, have an interest in
the first two factors is somewhat misleading. New York has an interest
in protecting New York medical creditors who treat patients who have
tobacco related injuries. However, New York has no interest in
protecting medical creditors in other states. Some of the plaintiffs were
treated by New York doctors, but the majority were not. Similarly, New
York has an interest in preventing its citizens from becoming wards of
New York. However, New York has no interest in the citizens of other
states who were injured outside New York who might become wards of
those other states. Again, the majority of plaintiffs are not New York
citizens. Thus, New York does not have an interest in applying its law to
other states' citizens under factors one and two.
Judge Weinstein's faulty analysis of factors one and two is caused
by the fact that he refuses to see the plaintiffs as individuals. One cannot
just lump all parties and claims together. ' A party who is an Oklahoma
citizen, who bought the cigarettes there, and who developed a cigarette
related disease there is situated differently from a person whose
connections are with New York. The fact that the Oklahoma citizen's
claims are somehow procedurally combined with a New York citizen's
claims does not make the Oklahoma claims New York claims.

195. See id. at 56, 72. Of course, the facts are even more complicated than this because many
of the plaintiffs may have moved from state to state during their long exposure to tobacco smoke.
196. Id. at 72 (citing Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y. 1985)). Some
scholars have criticized interest analysis' concept of interest as being too narrow. See LEA
BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS 85-89 (1995); Joseph William Singer, Real Conflicts, B.U. L.
REV. 1, 35-45 (1989). A state may have an interest in protecting outsiders or a state may want to
limit tort damages for foreign corporations in order to encourage companies to do business in that
state. Some scholars have also criticized interest analysis' interests as being hypothetical. See
BRILMAYER, supra, at 112, 229-30. The fact that someone might become a ward of a state is no
justification to adopt that state's law.
197. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 627 (3d Cir. 1996), aff'd, 521 U.S.
591 (1997) (requiring individualized choice of law determinations for each plaintiff's claims); see
also Spence v. Glock, 227 F.3d 308, 313 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Ford Motor Co. Ignition Switch
Prods. Liab. Litig., 174 F.R.D. 332, 340-71 (D.N.J. 1997).
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Concerning the third factor, Judge Weinstein is correct that New
York does have an "interest in ensuring that it does not become either a
base or a haven for law breakers to wreak injury nationwide."'' 18 But, is
this interest more important than the interests of the states where the
cigarettes were sold and caused the injuries?
As stated in Schultz, the traditional rule was that the law of the state
where the last act occurred governs choice of law in torts cases. 99 This
rule has been strongly criticized on the grounds that it is mechanical and
that it sometimes adopts the law of a state with a tenuous connection to
the controversy. 200 For example, a passenger from New York buys a
ticket in New York from a New York incorporated airline for a flight
from Albany, New York to Newark, New Jersey. Assume the plane
crashes just inside the New Jersey border due to the negligent
maintenance of the aircraft in New York, and the passenger is killed.
Should New Jersey law govern the wrongful death action solely because
the accident occurred there, despite the stronger connections to New
York? Most judges and scholars would conclude that New York law
controls because the significant connections are with New York or
because New York has a greater interest than New Jersey in applying its
law.20
There is much wisdom, however, in using the last act rule in most
cases. The state where an accident occurred will usually have the
greatest interest in having its law apply for conduct regulation.0 2 For
example, if two citizens from New York are injured in a traffic accident
in Montana with all portions of the negligence happening in Montana,
then Montana law should govern issues of liability because Montana has
the greatest interest in regulating conduct that occurred entirely within
its borders.
Split conduct/injury cases, such as the tobacco cases, are harder.
Assume that a manufacturer makes a car with defective brakes in
Michigan, and those defective breaks cause an accident in North
198. Simon, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 72.
199. See Schultz, 480 N.E.2d at 682; see also RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377
(1934).
200. See, e.g., BRILMAYER, supra note 196, at 25-27; David F. Cavers, A Critique of the
Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173, 208 (1933); Walter Wheeler Cook, The Logical
and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 457, 475-77 (1924).
201. Only eleven jurisdictions still use the traditional last act rule. See Symeon C. Symeonides,
Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2000: As the Century Turns, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 1,3 n.12
(2001). In addition, no modem conflicts scholar advocates the strict last act rule. See FRUEHWALD,
CHOICE OF LAW, supra note 3, at 20-31, 35-37.
202. See Simon, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 55.
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Carolina to a North Carolina citizen who bought the car there. Assume
that Michigan law has a cause of action for strict liability under products
liability, but that North Carolina requires proof of negligence for
recovery. Which state's law should govern liability issues? Obviously,
both states have an interest in applying their laws. Michigan has an
interest in regulating the conduct of manufacturers that make products in
Michigan, and North Carolina has an interest in regulating products that
are sold in North Carolina or cause injuries on its roads or to its citizens.
North Carolina, however, has the strongest interest in applying its law
(or the closest connection) to this case. Michigan's interest would be
satisfied by using its law with injuries that happen in Michigan. While it
may not want its manufacturers to export defective products to other
states, it does not have a strong interest in providing compensation for
injuries that occur outside its borders to nonresidents. On the other hand,
North Carolina has a vital interest in regulating conduct and preventing
injuries within its borders. It should not have to depend on other states'
laws to protect its citizens.
This author is not the only scholar to advocate choosing the law of
the state where a product was sold and caused injury, rather than the
state of manufacture." 3 For example, Professor Phaedon John Kozyris
has recently proposed the following choice of law rules for consumer
products to be applied in the following order:
Rule (a) [the plaintiff's] home state at the time of such acquisition
there or such acquisition in another state [by the victim] if also at that
time the same kind of product of the same manufacturer was also so
available at his home state .... Rule (b), that the victim in all
situations [third parties who did not themselves acquire the product or
it was not acquired for them] should be entitled to opt for the law of
the place of harm if it coincides with his then home, provided that
when the product was originally acquired the same kind of the same
manufacturer was also available there through commercial channels
... [and] for all hopelessly non-local situations, where the significant
affiliations are so dispersed as not to come within these concentrations
... Rule (c), a pure and simple application of the law of the state of the
consensual acquisition-delivery at the initial transaction on a theory of
ease of application, of more likely fairness as party-mutual and of
greater consistency with the basic assumption of state authority. "

203. See, e.g., Kozyris, supra note 155, at 1176-77.
204. Id.
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Significantly, Professor Kozyris considers the place of designmaking irrelevant, declaring that:
[s]ince we are dealing here not with criminal activity, and not with
activity that can cause any harm by itself, but only with civil
compensation of persons harmed by products, it seems to me that the
state where the preparatory acts of merely designing and making (and
storing) the product are taking place has no reason to concern itself
with its specifications and with the potential recoveries for harm
caused. The product cannot cause any harm until it is delivered to a
user, until it is placed in the market. It is the state where those
transactions take place that has the major reason to address these
issues, and balance the considerations, both for preventive and for
corrective purposes.2O5
He added, "[t]he fact that unilateral decisions may be made there
about the design, manufacture and even marketing of the product should
not be enough, for purposes of simple civil liability, to trigger the
application of its law." 2 6 He also noted that recent case law tends to
follow the above analysis.0 7
Simon is similar to the above Michigan-North Carolina
hypothetical, but there are significant differences that call even more
strongly for the application of the laws of the states where the plaintiffs
were domiciled, bought the cigarettes, and developed tobacco-related
diseases. While in the hypothetical all the conduct-the manufacture of
the defective product-occurred in Michigan, in Simon some of the
conduct took place outside New York. There is no indication that the
conspiracy was confined to New York: the cigarettes were manufactured
outside New York, and advertising that induced the plaintiffs to buy
cigarettes occurred in all fifty states. Thus, the injury occurred in all fifty
states-and some of the conduct causing that injury took place in all
fifty states. In addition, the combination of these factors is different for
each plaintiff. In such circumstances, it is extremely hard to justify
applying a single jurisdiction's law to all parties' claims.
Again, Judge Weinstein wanted to adopt a single state's law
because he saw the case as involving an injury to only one entity-the
public. 208

However, individuals suffered very real injuries-death,

cancer, heart disease, etc. There may also be an injury to the public as a
205. Id. at 1177-78.
206. Id. at 1178.
207. See id.
208.

See generally Simon v. Philip Morris Inc., 124 F. Supp. 2d 46 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
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whole, but the individual suffering caused by smoking dwarfs that public
interest.
Judge Weinstein's choice of law decision is unfair to the
individuals involved in the case. No matter how egregious the conduct
might be, there is no compensable injury unless the relevant sovereign's
law establishes a remedy that applies to the plaintiff.2 9 New York
certainly did not intend that its tort law apply to every tort that occurs in
the world. Furthermore, plaintiffs' recovery and defendants' conduct
should not be governed by the law of a state that has a weak connection
to a case or by the law of a state when another state has a significantly
stronger connection to the controversy.2 As was established above, the
states where the cigarettes were sold and where the smoking-related
disease developed had a stronger connection to (or interest in) the case. ,
Again, a state has a very strong interest in regulating conduct within its
borders. If justice requires that parties should be compensated for a
particular injury, that justice should be accomplished through
substantive law, not through manipulation of choice of law rules.2 3
Choice of law analysis requires a "sense of detachment" on the judge's
part.2 4 As Judge Wilkinson has stated: "In an increasingly diverse
country with many competing visions of the good, it is critical for law to
aspire to agreement on process-a task both more achievable than
21

209. Professor Kramer has observed:
The court in a multistate lawsuit must determine whether some rule of positive law
confers a right to recover. Making this determination is a problem of interpreting laws
offered by the parties to support their contentions. The only difference when it comes to
choice of law is that, instead of asking whether the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant acted negligently or was within the scope of his or her employment, we ask
whether the plaintiff must prove that he or she is from the state or that the accident
occurred within the state. But the extraterritorial reach of a law is still an element of a
claim or defense based on that law, determined by a process of interpretation that is,
because it directly defines the parties' rights, the very paradigm of what we mean by
"substantive."
Kramer, supra note 3, at 571-72.
210. For more on this concept, see FRUEHWALD, CHOICE OF LAW, supra note 3, at 71-78,
103-19.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 208-10.
212. See supra text accompanying note 202.
213. Professor Kozyris has observed, "the question of whether a state has the power and a good
reason to apply its own or another law in a particular context is entirely different from the question
of whether the chosen law is substantively just." Kozyris, supra note 155, at 1171.
214. See Wilkinson, supra note 183, at 1388 ("[B]y refusing to ask the institutional questions a
priori, we deny ourselves a sense of detachment.").
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agreement on substance and more suited to our profession than waving
the banners of ideological truth."2 5
In addition, as was mentioned above, use of a single state's law in a
mass tort case may not always result in a justice. 2"' For example, forum
law may not allow punitive damages, while a plaintiff's home state
might. Likewise, the forum state might limit damages or provide a
defense when a state with a closer connection to the controversy does
not.
This author's Kantian view of the individual in mass tort cases
contrasts markedly with Judge Weinstein's communitarian-utilitarian
notion.2177 Under utilitarianism, "human actions and practices should be
evaluated ultimately in terms of their tendencies to advance the general
welfare or social good-i.e., to produce as a consequence other
happiness or well-being or satisfaction of a majority of persons."2 '8 In
other words, choices should be made to produce "'[t]he greatest
happiness for the greatest number."' 2 9 On the other hand, Kant felt that
"'[a]ll rational persons have a right not to be used without their consent
even for the benefit of others.' 20 Kantianism respects and protects the
special status of rational, autonomous persons.221 Under Kantianism, "it
is always wrong to victimize, [and every individual] has an absolute
right to be protected against such victimization. 22 2 As Ronald Dworkin
has stated: "Individual rights are ... trumps held by individuals.
Individuals have rights when, for some reason, a collective goal is not a
sufficient justification for denying them what they wish, as individuals,
to have or to do, or not a sufficient justification for imposing some loss
or injury upon them. 223 Moreover, under Kantianism, part of a rational

215. Id. at 1387. By process, Judge Wilkinson means what institution should make the
decision. He further asserted that "[a] multicultural nation may find in process a means of muting
differences. A society beset by bewildering change may find in process stable ways of making that
change come about. A culture tom over questions of personal autonomy may discover in process a
means of decentralizing and diversifying outcomes." Id. at 1393-94.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 209-13.
217. Judge Weinstein says that he relies upon Kant, along with Bentham, Rawls, Nozick, and
others. See WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 6. However, his mass tort philosophy
relies much more on Bentham (utilitarianism) than Kant.
218.

JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO

JURISPRUDENCE 72 (rev. ed. 1990).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 79.
221. See id. at 82.
222. Id. at 81.
223. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi (1978).
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. • 224

life is the ability to make reliable predictions. As Professor Bailey H.
Kuklin has stated: "[O]ne can hardly be considered an autonomous,
moral person responsibly conducting one's own affairs
if the
25
unexpected.
substantially
are
actions
one's
of
consequences
Adopting a single jurisdiction's rule for all parties in a mass tort
case would usually satisfy utilitarianism. The greater efficiency and
reduction of transactions costs would outweigh a few individuals' losses
of their substantive rights. In some instances, if the tort claims were not
aggregated, then many injured persons would not receive compensation.
Kantianism, however, would not accept the above solution. If
aggregation results in any significant loss to an individual, the dignity
and autonomy of that individual has not been respected. 226 The fact that
there has
been anhe overall
for the collective does not justify the
victmiztionof
"• • gain221
victimization of the individual. In addition, an autonomous individual
cannot make a rational choice when the law is unpredictable, as it is
under a choice of law system where choice of forum determines the
applicable law.228
Respect for state sovereignty also affects individual justice. Proper
allocation of power under our federal system protects individual
liberty. 22' As James Madison wrote:
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the
people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the
portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate
departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people.
The different governments will control
each other, at the same time
2
10
that each will be controlled by itself.
Similarly, Justice O'Connor has written:
State sovereignty is not just an end in itself: "Rather, federalism
secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of
sovereign power.... Just as the separation and independence of the
coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the
accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance
224. See Bailey H. Kuklin, The Justification for Protecting Reasonable Expectations, 29
HOFSTRA L. REV. 863, 868 (2001).

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
Practice,
230.

Id.
See supra notes 221-22 and accompanying text.
See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 224-25 and accompanying text.
See Scott Fruehwald, If Men Were Angels: The New Judicial Activism in Theory and
83 MARQ. L. REV. 435, 444-51 (1999).
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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of power between the States and the Federal Government
will reduce
231
the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.,

Judge Weinstein's choice of law decision ignores state sovereignty
completely. As noted above, Judge Weinstein downplays the states'
interest by declaring that a state has an interest in seeing that its citizens
are compensated, rather than having its laws applied . However, this is
a decision for the states to make; a federal judge does not have the
authority to overrule a state's decision concerning its laws. The United

States Constitution gives the federal government limited powers, and
those powers not explicitly given to the federal government are reserved
to the states.233 In addition, who is to say that Judge Weinstein's

decisions are wiser than those of state legislatures?234 Despite Judge
Weinstein's conclusion that choice of law has entered "'a period of
equity and natural law,' 235 natural law principles have not been
commonly used by American courts since the early twentieth century.2 36
In any event, under federalism principles, a federal judge cannot use
natural law to overrule state positive law.
The constitutional dimensions of Judge Weinstein's decision also
relate to individual justice since the Constitution is largely concerned
with protecting individuals. Judge Weinstein is probably correct that his

231. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (citation omitted).
232. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
233. See U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also New York, 505 U.S. at 187 (stating that the
Constitution "divides power among sovereigns and among branches of government precisely so that
we may resist the temptation to concentrate power in one location as an expedient solution to the
crisis of the day"); Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst., 169 F.3d 820, 903 (4th Cir. 1999) (Niemeyer,
J., concurring), aff'd sub noa.United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) ("What had emerged
from Philadelphia in 1787 was a legal text creating a government constructed upon principles of
federalism. The Constitution accomplishes this result by limiting the power of the national
government, and giving it only enumerated powers.").
234. Professor Southerland has wisely asserted:
Diversity, in my view, is not unhealthy. What is unhealthy is the presumption that we
know what is best for other people; what is unhealthier still is the willingness to impose
our judgments on them, by main force if necessary. The arrogance of power has been a
recurring theme in the discordant music of this century. More than most, those of us
drawn to the legal system seem prone to the delusion that we have answers for the ills of
society. The temptation to prescribe for others is powerfully seductive; recognizing the
impulse for what it is is the first step in resisting it.
Southerland, supra note 99, at 501.
235. Simon v. Philip Morris, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 2d 46, 67 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting Joseph H.
Beale, I A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS 50 (1935)).
236. See FRUEHWALD, CHOICE OF LAW, supra note 3, at 48.
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decision is constitutional under Shutts.2"7 The fact that a significant
portion of the conspiracy occurred in New York probably satisfies
Shutts' requirement that "New York must have a significant contact or
significant aggregation of contacts to the claims asserted by 'each
member of the plaintiff class' to ensure that the choice of that state's law
is not arbitrary or unfair., 23' However, this author believes that a due
process case after Shutts makes Judge Weinstein's decision questionable
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In BMW of
North America, Inc. v. Gore, the Supreme Court ruled that a state could
not calculate punitive damages based on conduct in other states that was
not illegal in those states. In Gore, BMW had not disclosed the fact
that it had repainted Gore's car before delivery. Such conduct was
illegal in Alabama, the forum state, and approximately half of the other
states, but what BMW had done was legal in about half the states. 24, The
Court held that Alabama could not calculate punitive damages based on
conduct that was legal in certain states under the due process clause
because in doing so Alabama was imposing its policy on the other
states. 42 The Court reasoned that a state is not only limited by the federal
power over interstate commerce, but also by "the need to respect the
interests of other States."243 Therefore, "it follows from these principles
of state sovereignty and comity that a State may not impose economic
sanctions on violators of its laws with the intent of changing the
tortfeasors' lawful conduct in other States."2" In applying New York law
to claims where the tobacco was sold in another state, to non-New York
citizens with the injury occurring outside New York, New York is
imposing its policy on other states. Judge Weinstein is not respecting the
states' interests, and he is trying to change conduct that is lawful in other

237. See Simon, 124 F, Supp. 2d at 69-71. This author has argued elsewhere that the

constitutional limits set forth in Shutts and Allstate, are too liberal. See

FRUEHWALD, CHOICE OF
LAW, supra note 3, at 65-94; Scott Fruehwald, Constitutional Constraints on State Choice of Law,
24 U. DAYTON L. REV. 40 (1998). Professor Kozyris has stated similarly, "we should support a

broad reading and an effective application of the above-mentioned U.S. constitutional limitations on
the excessive outreach of state power." Kozyris, supra note 155, at 1170. 1 will limit the discussion
in this paper to existing constitutional constraints on choice of law.
238. Simon, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 69.
239. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572-73, 585 (1996).
240. See id. at 564.
241. See id. at 565.
242. See id. at 572-73, 585.
243. Id. at 571.
244. Id. at 572.
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states. Accordingly, Judge Weinstein's choice of law decision violates
the due process clause under Gore.
V.

A PARTIAL SOLUTION: SUBGROUPS FOR DIFFERENT
SUBSTANTIVE LAWS

Judge Weinstein suggested that if the Court of Appeals rejects his
choice of law determination that the court should remand to decide
whether subclasses could accommodate the variations in state law.2 45 He
noted that an appendix to plaintiffs' brief demonstrated that there were
few material differences among the states on fraudulent concealment.246
The use of subclasses for different state substantive rules is a
legitimate method of maintaining a class action.4 7 This device can allow
for variations in state law, and not permit the class action to change the
substantive outcome. For example, the court in In re Prudential
Insurance Co. of America Sales PracticesLitigation found that "Class
Counsel [had] grouped potentially applicable state laws systematically
into manageable patterns, completely obviating potential complications
from choice of law differences. 24 8 In addition, as Ryan Phair has noted,
the predominance requirement of Rule 23 can be satisfied by a common
question of law or fact.249
The use of subclasses may not be as difficult as some commentators
and judges claim. There will not be fifty different substantive rules245. See Simon v. Philip Morris Inc., 124 F. Supp. 2d 46,77 (E.D.N.Y.2000).
246. See id. Of course, such a determination should not ignore significant differences between
state choice of law rules as some mass tort cases have done.
247. Ryan Patrick Phair has also suggested subclasses as a solution to the choice of law
problem in class actions. See Ryan Patrick Phair, Note, Resolving the "Choice-of-Law Problem" in
Rule 23(b)(3) Nationwide Class Actions, 67 U. Cm. L. REV. 835, 845 (2000).
248. 962 F. Supp. 450, 468 (D.N.J. 1997), aff'd, 148 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1998).
249. See Phair, supra note 247, at 845; see also Stephen R. Bough & Andrea G. Bough,
Conflict of Laws and Multi-State Class Actions: How Variations in State Law Affect the
Predominance Requirement of Rule 23(b)(3), 68 UMKC L. REV. 1, 26-27 (1999). The requirements
for a class action are set forth in FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a):
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf
of all only if (1)the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of
the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
In addition, in order to maintain the type of class action that is usually used with mass torts, the
court must find that "the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." FED. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3). Of these requirements, choice of law problems have the most effect on commonality,
predominance, and superiority.
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sometimes there will be no differences and there will rarely be more than
three or four choices. As Professor Kramer has stated, "the court should
be able first to reduce the number of conflicts to a relatively manageable
number and then to group states for purposes of conflicts analysis."25
When the variations in state law become too complex, a court
should refuse class certification."' For example in Castano v. American
Tobacco Co.,"' a case seeking compensation for nicotine addiction, the
Fifth Circuit decertified the class action because of the lower court's
failure to consider how variations in state law would affect two class
action requirements: predominance and superiority. Concerning
predominance the court declared, "[i]n a multi-state class action,
variations in state law may swamp any common issues and defeat
predominance. 253 In this case, the lower court had not properly
considered how variations in state law might affect predominance
because the parties had only briefly addressed the matter and the court's
review of state law variances was cursory. 54 Concerning superiority, the
court found extensive manageability problems with the class, including
difficult choice of law determinations."' The court also rejected
plaintiffs' contention that a class trial would preserve judicial resources
as speculative.256 Moreover, there was no "negative value suit" in this
case because individual damages claims are high, punitive damages are
available in many states, and the prevailing parties may recover
attorney's fees under many states' consumer protection acts. 57 The court
asserted, "certification of an immature tort [a tort that has not been
widely litigated] brings with it unique problems
that may consume more
258
save.,
will
certification
than
judicial resources

250. Kramer, supra note 3, at 583.
251. See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996); Georgine v. Amchem
Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 618 (3d Cir. 1996) (affirming the decertification of the class action based
on Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)'s commonality and predominance requirements); In re Am. Med. Sys.,
Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1085 (6th Cir. 1996) (failing to consider how the law of negligence differed
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction); Philip Morris Inc., v. Angeletti, 752 A.2d 200, 230 (Md. 2000)
(applying the place of the injury rule).
252. 84 F.3d at 740-41.
253. Id. at 741.
254. See id. at 742.
255. See id. at 747.
256. See id.
257. See id. at 748.
258. Id. at 749.
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VI.

361

CONCLUSION

Choice of law is a vital part of any lawsuit because it establishes the
parties' substantive rights and defenses. For individual justice to exist in
mass tort actions, aggregation cannot change the substantive law that is
to be applied. Judge Weinstein's choice of law decision in Simon that
applied New York law to all parties' claims in the name of efficiency
and communitarianism changed the substantive law for some of the
parties. Consequently, Judge Weinstein failed to respect the dignity and
autonomy of many of the individuals in that case.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2002

39

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 2

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol31/iss2/2

40

